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Abstract This study examined emotional awareness
in children with autism. Twenty-two high functioning
children with autism (mean age 10 years and
2 months) and 22 typically developing children, mat-
ched for age and gender, were presented with the four
basic emotions (happiness, anger, sadness and fear) in
single and multiple emotion tasks. Findings suggest
that children with autism have difficulties identifying
their own emotions and less developed emotion
concepts (which causes an impaired capacity to dif-
ferentiate between one’s emotions within the negative
spectrum). The outcome seems to point more to a
single emotion perspective within the negative domain,
with a more prominent position of fear in children with
autism than in typically developing children.
Keywords Autism Æ Emotional awareness Æ HFA Æ
Emotion concepts Æ Emotions Æ Fear
Introduction
The difficulties that children from the autistic spectrum
have in understanding other people’s mental states are
widely documented; their mind-reading abilities are
hampered by a dysfunctional theory of mind (e.g.
Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000; Frith,
2003). Much less is known about their awareness of
their own mental states. It can be argued that a func-
tional theory of mind is also necessary to understand
your own functioning (Frith, 2003; Happé, 1994). For
example, primary emotional reactions are caused by
involuntary processes, which can only be understood by
post hoc analyses that include more than just the
objective situation (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Despite
many years of quarrelling with your older sister, you
might still feel upset and left behind when she moves
out of your parents’ house to study in another city. The
most obvious conclusion then is: ‘‘I must have some
positive feelings for her’’ or even ‘‘I really miss these
quarrels’’. Primary emotions are clearly the result of
one’s (not necessarily conscious) personal attitudes to a
situation. They may therefore help to reach a better
understanding of the desires and beliefs that underlie
this attitude. Without a functional theory of mind,
children from the autistic spectrum are probably ham-
pered in making these kinds of self-evaluations.
Establishing the specific nature of one’s affective state
is considered to be the first step in this analysis
(Schachter & Singer, 1962), and we might even question
whether children with autism will make this attempt to
label their emotions. Feeling bad in the example above,
allows for less specific inferences than feeling sad.
Emotion Awareness in Children with Autism
Although children with autism are known to be less
emotionally expressive in social situations (Attwood,
Frith, & Hermelin 1988; Langdell, 1978), they do
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exhibit more emotions to non-living objects (Snow,
Hertzig, & Shapiro, 1987). Therefore, children with
autism might not strategically use or even fully
appreciate the communicative value of emotional
expressions, but there is no reason to assume that they
are less emotional than other children. However, an
emotional state does not automatically imply emo-
tional awareness. Monitoring one’s own emotional
processes is an ability that children have to learn
(Harris, 1989; Selman, 1981). Since the activity of the
emotional ‘‘core system’’ (Levenson, 1999) is not open
to introspection, the awareness of an active emotion is
probably based on not much more than the detection
of bodily and behavioural signals in combination with
the evaluation of the actual situation in which they
arise; an observed contingency that is promoted by
remarks of knowledgeable others. These others tend to
use certain labels for these combinations of phenom-
ena (‘‘Why are you trembling? Don’t be afraid of the
dog, he doesn’t bite’’). Even learning this ‘‘simple’’ act
of labelling emotions requires that a child combines
introspective information, his own behavioural obser-
vations, and the (frequently implicit) verbal informa-
tion provided by others (Harris & Olthof, 1982).
The emotion concept gradually becomes a mental
phenomenon in normal development. Six-year-old
children tend to answer a question like ‘‘How do you
know that you are happy?’’ by ‘‘When you are laugh-
ing’’ or ‘‘When it is your birthday’’, which contain
observable elements like expressive behaviour and
eliciting situations. In contrast, the typical answer of
older children and adults is ‘‘You are happy when you
feel happy inside’’ (Harris, Olthof, & Meerum
Terwogt, 1981). Nonetheless, it is hardly possible to
explain exactly what it is that you are feeling. There is
probably much less direct information to gain from
introspection than we are inclined to think. Cognitive
emotion theorists will predict that, next to some rather
ambiguous physiological signals such as an accelerated
heartbeat, we become aware of a primitive ‘‘action
tendency’’ (Frijda, 1986). For example, fear reveals
itself by the tendency to run away. The interpretation
(e.g. ‘‘I’m afraid of that dog’’) is, as argued before,
based on a cognitive post hoc analysis that aims to link
this primary emotional reaction to situational circum-
stances (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Levenson, 1999).
Therefore, the tendency to primarily regard emotions
as inner processes reveals a new theoretical concep-
tion: people are autonomic organisms that express
their relation to the outside world by thoughts and
feelings. Without a fully functional theory of mind, it
might be questionable whether we will find the same
development in children with autism. A theory of mind
stresses that people make a personal representation of
the objective world. Without such a representational
conception it is not you that is afraid of the dog, but the
dog that is scary; this is a subtle difference that can
have large implications, for instance in the realm of
emotion regulation strategies (Meerum Terwogt &
Olthof, 1989; Meerum Terwogt & Stegge, 1995).
If ‘‘being afraid’’ is not essentially different from
‘‘being in a scary situation’’ for children with autism,
one would expect that they can link emotions to situ-
ational characteristics, especially when—as in the tasks
that are presented in this paper—we limit ourselves to
high functioning children with autism, who are well
able to make use of the information presented by
verbal communication. Children from the autistic
spectrum have been shown in previous studies to
understand the link between the four basic emotions,
fear, anger, happiness and sadness, and their eliciting
events (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Dennis, Lockyer, & Laz-
enby, 2000; Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & Stockmann,
2000). Almost without exception, 10-year-old high-
functioning children predicted correctly how someone
would feel if his or her favourite pet was ill (Rieffe
et al., 2000). However, these are the kind of proto-
typical connections that are usually stressed by verbal
communication. They use the fear label in connection
with big scary dogs, and seldom in connection with
little furry hamsters, even though these animals might
create fear in some children. Only through introspec-
tion or the careful observation of others, one will be
able to find out that there are always exceptions to the
rule. Yet, children with autism are known to neglect
the emotional expressions of others (Begeer, Rieffe,
Meerum Terwogt, & Stockmann, 2006; Jennings, 1974;
Weeks & Hobson, 1987).
Capps, Yirmiya, and Sigman (1992) asked these
kinds of questions and found that nearly all high-
functioning children with autism were able to provide
understandable examples. The few exceptions did not
differ between the group with autism and the control
group. It has to be noted though that the experimenter
recalled a time in which she had felt the emotion when
a child was unable to provide an example. The study
does not report how often this occurred. (The study by
Capps and colleagues showed that reflective emotions
like pride and embarrassment were more problematic,
but the origin of this finding lies outside the questions
we want to address in this study.) In another study,
Jaedicke, Storoschuk, and Lord (1994) looked at the
number of times that children with autism and a mat-
ched control group referred to another person when
asked what made them feel happy, angry, sad, scared
and worried. Overall, they found that children with
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autism were as able as the control group to give
descriptions of the various emotions, but their exam-
ples less often referred to social interactions. Unfor-
tunately, the authors did not look to the five emotions
separately. Moreover, the study included high and
lower functioning children with autism who were
compared to normally developing control children and
children with learning difficulties.
Multiple Emotions
Additionally, it is important to note that apart from a
few prototypical situations, nearly all situations in real
life can be regarded from different perspectives. You
can feel angry with a friend who falsely blames you in
front of an adult for breaking one of your toys, but also
sad about losing the beloved object. Situations like this
less obviously appeal to scripted knowledge about
emotions. Young children tend to stop their analysis
when they have discovered one of the perspectives
(Meerum Terwogt, Koops, Oosterhoff, & Olthof,
1986). Around the age of nine, children typically start
to acknowledge the existence of simultaneous emotion
perspectives; first the possibility of same-valence
emotions (it is possible to be angry and sad at the same
time) and, somewhat later, also the possibility of
simultaneous emotions of an opposite valence (e.g.
happy because you are going to the zoo, but sad
because your parents don’t allow you to bring your
friend along) (Harter & Whitesell, 1989). Even in a
study that is limited to the same four basic emotions,
the acknowledgement of mixed emotions clearly asks
for a higher level of emotional awareness. Moreover,
the ability to regard one and the same situation from
different perspectives is an ability that is also closely
related to a theory of mind: it requires the acknowl-
edgement that one can have different representations
of an undivided reality.
Study Aims
In the present experiment, our first aim is to examine
the ability of high functioning children with autism to
produce concrete examples of emotion evoking situa-
tions from their own experiences. In accordance with
earlier studies (Capps et al., 1992; Jaedicke et al.,
1994), we expect no differences in this study between
normally developing children and children with autism
with respect to their ability to provide plausible situa-
tions in which they have experienced one of the basic
emotions happiness, sadness, anger, and fear. We will
analyse the children’s responses in two ways. First, we
will examine the extent to which children use their own
experience as a frame of reference, e.g. ‘‘Last week,
when I had a fight with my brother.’’ If children with
autism derive their emotion theories mainly from ver-
bal communication, we should expect them to provide
more prototypical examples when asked about their
own experiences. Second, whether the examples pro-
vided are social or non-social will be examined. The
social problems of children with autism make it less
plausible that they will refer to an example of a situ-
ation in this domain, as was shown in the results of the
study by Jaedicke et al. (1994).
The second aim in is to examine whether high
functioning children with autism are aware of the
multiple emotional impacts of situations that contain
different emotional perspectives. Children will be
presented with a second task which is focussed on sit-
uations with a mixed emotional impact. If possible
awareness discrepancies between children with autism
and their peers are still concealed in the first task
regarding single emotions, they may surface in these
more demanding mixed conditions. Instead of inter-
viewing children about their knowledge of multiple
emotions, researchers in other studies presented nor-
mally developing children with emotion-evoking vign-
ettes and asked if they would feel angry, happy, sad or
scared (Meerum Terwogt et al., 1986; Wintre & Val-
lance, 1994). The fact that this method is less depen-
dent on verbal abilities might contribute to the finding
that the awareness of mixed emotions typically arises
somewhat earlier in these circumstances (i.e. around
the age of eight; Wintre & Valance, 1994). In the sec-
ond task of the present experiment we opted for this
latter approach, because children’s verbal ability factor
is often mentioned as an unintended bottleneck in the
experiments with children with autism (e.g. Boucher,
1996). We expected children from the autistic spectrum
to detect fewer emotional perspectives.
Method
Participants
Twenty-two children with autism (20 boys, 2 girls) and
22 normally developing children (20 boys, 2 girls) par-
ticipated in this study. Written parental consent was
obtained for all children who participated in this study.
The children with autism came from four primary spe-
cial schools for high-functioning children with autism in
Greater London. The schools were all located at middle
to high socio-economic areas. All children were diag-
nosed with Autism (5) or Asperger syndrome (17) by a
child psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist using DSM-IV
J Autism Dev Disord (2007) 37:455–465 457
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criteria, prior to their attendance at the schools.
Since children with Asperger syndrome are difficult to
distinguish from children with autism, most researchers
regard them as equivalent (Micali, Chakrabarti, &
Fombonne, 2001; Mayes & Calhoun, 2003, 2004).
Therefore, both groups will be referred to as children
with autism in this study. The mean age of this group
was 10 years and 2 months (SD = 1 year and
5 months). Only children with no other known
disabilities were included. To ensure that the children
with autism participating in this study were of average or
higher intelligence and that their verbal skills were good
enough to enable them to understand the vignettes and
test questions with which they were presented, teachers
selected children from their classes to participate based
on their verbal abilities. Additionally, a non-verbal test
was administered (Raven’s Coloured Progressive
Matrices Test, 1984) and confirmed an average non-
verbal intelligence (Mean = 46.68) for this group.
The children in the control group (mean age
10 years and 3 months, SD = 1 year and 5 months)
were recruited from one primary school in Dublin,
which was located in a lower socio-economic area.
Children were not explicitly tested for their intelli-
gence, but teachers were asked to choose children with
average or good verbal skills in order to correspond
with the autism group. Other inclusion criteria speci-
fied that the children’s native language was English,
that they had no learning disabilities or other disorders
that their teachers were aware of.
Materials
Emotion Identification
As an introduction, the experimenter first asked chil-
dren to identify pride. Although the findings from
Capps et al. (1992) did not suggest that children with
autism reached a perfect understanding of this complex
emotion—similar to the findings with young children
(Harris, 1989) for whom pride is often confounded with
happiness—these authors also reported that children
with autism did not find it difficult to provide answers.
Therefore, the emotion served in our study as a useful
preliminary question, which also created better balance
between negative and positive emotions. Responses to
this question were not included in the analyses. The
four basic emotions that followed were then presented
in random order so as to tease out potential order
effects of the emotions.
In order to see the extent to which children
acknowledge their own emotional experiences,
children were asked the following questions:
‘‘....... [name child], do you feel ..... [emotion]
sometimes?’’ (question 1)
‘‘Can you tell me about the last time you felt.....
[emotion]?
What happened, why were you..... [emotion]?’’
(question 2)
‘‘I would also like to know how..... [emotion] you
felt.
Can you show me on this scale how..... [emotion]
you felt?’’ (question 3)
A 5-point scale was introduced to children in order
for them to respond to question 3:
‘‘Look, if you felt very very proud, you take the
highest bar in this scale. And if you felt just a tiny little
bit proud, you point at the lowest bar. You could also
feel quite proud, and that might be somewhere in the
middle. So, just try to think which one fits best how you
felt.’’
Scoring
The content of children’s examples given by each
emotion (question 2) were coded twice. First,
responses were categorised as social or non-social. The
social impact of an event is sometimes hard to decide.
For example, the answer ‘‘when I get a present’’
(reason for happiness) might refer to the present itself
(non-social), but can also be connected to the act of
giving (social). In order to get a univocal criterion, only
explicit references to another person were coded
‘‘social’’. For example ‘‘when my brother gives me a
present’’.
Second, references to a specific situation or event
were taken as an indication that children were using
their own experiences as a frame of reference instead
of relying on scripted knowledge about emotion-
evoking events. Children’s answers to question 2 were
thus coded as specific or non-specific. Two raters coded
transcripts of children’s responses independently. The
interrater agreement was 96%. Differences were
solved by discussion.
Multiple Emotions
This task was directly copied from the Multiple Emo-
tions task designed by Meerum Terwogt et al. (1986).
Children were first given an introduction in which they
were asked to imagine that the event in the stories had
happened to them:
‘‘Now I’ll tell you some stories about things that
might not have happened to you, but I want you
458 J Autism Dev Disord (2007) 37:455–465
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to listen carefully and try to imagine what it
would be like if they really happened to you. Ok?
After each story, I’ll ask you how you would feel
if it really happened to you. And there are no
right or wrong answers, I just want to know what
children of your age think about these stories.’’
The task was then introduced by an example story
(accompanied by a drawing) and an explicit instruction
was given to inform children about the possibility of
experiencing more than one emotion simultaneously:
‘‘Imagine, you have a cat and you are very fond of
her. You play with her a lot and she always sleeps
in your room. But she has been ill for the last few
days. It looks like it is her stomach. You take her
to the vet. ‘‘Yes’’, the vet says, ‘‘it is awful but I
have to operate on her’’. ‘‘But after the opera-
tion’’, he says, ‘‘she will be well and healthy again
and she will have no pain anymore’’.
So imagine this happened to you. Now some
children would feel totally nothing. But other
children would have a sad feeling and nothing
else. And other children might even have more
than one feeling, for example sad and happy. I
would like to know which feelings you would
have, but everything is possible. You might have
no feelings, or you might even have a lot of dif-
ferent feelings.’’
Drawings of facial expressions that matched the four
emotions they were asked about were placed in front of
the children. Children were asked: ‘‘What do you think,
would you feel sad (angry, happy, scared)?’’ (question
1). Children could respond verbally or non-verbally by
pointing at one of the faces. When children responded
positively to a particular emotion, they were asked:
‘‘Okay, and how sad (angry, happy, scared) would you
feel?’’ (question 2). The same scale as in the Emotion
Identification task was used. The four emotions were
asked about in random order.
Children were then presented with four stories that
were taken from Meerum Terwogt et al. study (1986).
Two stories were designed to evoke a positive as well
as a negative emotion (the intended combinations were
happiness and sadness) and two stories were designed
to evoke a mixture of negative emotions (the intended
combinations were anger and sadness) (see Appendix:
Multiple emotions vignettes). However, since it is vir-
tually impossible to avoid alternative perspectives to
multiple emotion scripts that evoke emotions other
than the ones intended, we did not discriminate
between ‘‘correct’’ and ‘‘incorrect’’ answers. All four
basic emotion responses were considered permissible
in each script, which also included fear. To avoid too
many stories with a negative impact, two filler stories
were included that were designed to evoke happiness
only. Children’s responses to these stories were not
part of the design and were not included in the anal-
yses. Similar to the Meerum Terwogt et al. study
(1986), all stories were accompanied by simple black
and white drawings.
Procedure
Children were taken from their classroom to a separate
room by a female experimenter. Each session took
approximately 20 min. Children’s responses were tape-
recorded. Transcripts of children’s responses were used
to score their answers after the session. Following a
short introduction by the experimenter, the experi-
menter asked the children’s permission to record the
session. All children agreed to this. Children tried out
the tape recorder at the beginning of each session by
saying their name and their age. Then they were shown
the cards with the faces that were used in the Multiple
Emotions task and asked to point to the angry, happy,
sad and scared face. No children showed any difficul-
ties in matching the emotion and the corresponding
facial expression. Following this, children were asked
the questions for the Emotion Identification task. Fi-
nally, they were presented with the stories and the
pictures of the Multiple Emotions task.
Results
Data Analyses
Children’s responses to the Single Emotions task were
analysed in two ways. First, the scores were collapsed
over the four emotions, which allowed parametric
testing. Second, the emotions were looked at sepa-
rately. Responses to these questions were dichotomous
(yes/no), therefore, non-parametric statistics were
applied to analyse these data for each emotion, with
the exception of the emotion intensities.
Single Emotions
The first question addressed was whether children with
autism acknowledge the experience of their own
emotions to the same extent as normally developing
children. Children were asked if they sometimes
experienced sadness, happiness, anger and fear (ques-
tion 1). The number of children that answered
J Autism Dev Disord (2007) 37:455–465 459
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affirmative to each of these questions is depicted by the
n’s in Table 1. Collapsed over four emotions, children
with autism more often denied that they had ever
experienced one or more of these emotions than the
control group (Mean = 3.14 (SD = 1.04) and
Mean = 3.59 (SD = .67), respectively, T(42) = 1.73,
P £ .045). All 22 children in each group reported feeling
happy sometimes. Within the control group, that was
also the case for anger. The difference between groups is
due to the negative emotions, which were reported less
frequently by the children with autism. Three autistic
boys even claimed to have never experienced any of the
three negative emotions. Separate v2-tests showed that
only Anger differed between the two groups (v2 = 5.64,
df = 1, P £ .018): children with autism acknowledged
anger less frequently than children from the control
group. Bonferroni correction was applied.
Second, when children acknowledged the emotion,
they were asked to provide an occasion in which they
had experienced these emotions (question 2). A count
of how often they referred to a specific situation was
made. Since all answers provided plausible cases for
the emotion in question (as judged by two independent
raters) none of them was excluded. Collapsed over
four emotions, children with autism made fewer
references to specific situations than the control group
(Mean proportions, respectively, .77 (SD = .39) and
.96 (SD = .10); T(42) = 2.23, P £ .016). The mean
scores for Group per Emotion are presented in
Table 1. These scores are exclusively based on the
number of children that claimed to have experienced
that particular emotion (question 1, see corresponding
n value). When analysed for each emotion separately,
again only Anger proved to differ between groups
(v2 = 9.18, df = 1, P £ .002). Bonferroni correction
was applied.
Concerning the content of the examples: collapsed
over the four emotions, children with autism provided
fewer social examples than the control group (Mean
proportions, respectively, .25 (SD = .28) and .67
(SD = .25); T(40) = 5.14, P £ .001). Table 2 shows the
mean number of references to social situations per
group and per emotion. (Note that some of the children,
after claiming that they sometimes felt the emotion on
the first question, nonetheless failed to provide an
example on question 2 this accounts for the differences
in n-values between Tables 1 and 2.) When analysed
separately for each emotion, the difference between the
two groups was significant for Happiness, Anger and
Fear (respectively, v2 = 7.34, df = 1, P £ .007;
v2 = 6.62, df = 1, P £ .010 and v2 = 7.29, df = 1,
P £ .007), but not for Sadness. Bonferroni correction
was applied.
With the exception of two children, all children with
autism mentioned non-social, idiosyncratic reasons for
Happiness (‘‘when I am looking in my science book’’),
whereas half of the control group referred to inter-
personal situations (‘‘when you meet new friends’’).
All but one child from the control group gave social
examples for Anger, whereas only two-thirds of the
children with autism did so. However, a common
answer in this respect for both groups was getting
bullied or teased (90% of the social answers for anger).
Sadness was explained in nearly all of the social an-
swers in the autism group by references to a family
member (parents fighting, one parent leaving, a parent
who had died, being teased by brother or sister). In the
control group, half of the answers also referred to a
family member, but the other half referred to a prob-
lem with a friend. Only one child with autism once
mentioned a quarrel with a friend. Another child from
the autistic group referred to his condition when
Table 1 Number of children
that acknowledged an
emotion and mean number of
on situation descriptions as a
function of Group and
Emotion
‘‘When did you feel...?’’
Happiness Anger Sadness Fear
n M SD n M SD n M SD n M SD
Autism group 22 .77 .43 17 .65 .49 17 .76 .44 13 .77 .44
Control group 22 1.00 .00 22 1.00 .00 19 .95 .23 16 .88 .34
Table 2 Mean number of
references to social events as
a function of Group and
Emotion
‘‘When did you feel...?’’
Happiness Anger Sadness Fear
n M SD n M SD n M SD n M SD
Autism group 19 .11 .32 15 .62 .49 15 .53 .52 12 .00 .00
Control group 22 .50 .51 22 .95 .21 18 .67 .49 13 .46 .52
460 J Autism Dev Disord (2007) 37:455–465
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illustrating sadness: ‘‘when I cannot tell the difference
between people’s feelings’’. Fear did not evoke any
social illustrations in children with autism. Children
from the control group referred again to bullying (4
times out of 7) or because they were worried about
someone else’s well being (3 times). Overall, explain-
ing negative emotions by being bullied or teased in-
volved 25 and 40% of the social explanations in the
autism group and the control group, respectively.
The third question asked for the intensity of the
emotions indicated by our participants. Children who
denied the experiences of an emotion on the first
question were attributed a score of 0 for intensity. The
maximum score for intensity was 5. A 2 (Group: Aut-
ism versus Control) · 4 (Emotion: happiness, anger,
sadness, fear) analysis of variance with repeated mea-
sures on the last factor showed no group-effects, but
only a main effect for Emotion (F(3,126) = 19.90,
P £ .001). Happiness (mean = 4.48, SD = 1.11) was
ascribed a stronger intensity than Anger (mean = 3.07,
SD = 1.80), Sadness (mean = 2.68, SD = 1.88) or Fear
(mean = 2.07, SD = 2.00) by both groups. The differ-
ences found seem to reflect a very common normative
attitude to the emotions at this age: intense negative
emotions—and especially fear—are more difficult to
acknowledge than intense positive emotions (Saarni,
1999). Children with autism are clearly no exception. A
post hoc T-test (Happiness versus Anger) confirmed
this difference (T(43) = 4.72, P < .001). Anger was
ascribed a stronger intensity than Fear (T(43) = 2.77,
P < .008), but no other significant differences were
found between the negative emotions. Bonferroni
correction was applied.
Multiple Emotions
When looking at the number of emotional perspectives
detected in the multiple emotion task, it appeared that
children with autism identified fewer different emo-
tional perspectives per story (a mean number of 1.77
per story, out of a maximum of 4, versus 2.12 in the
control group). A 2 (Group) · 2 (Condition: PN versus
NN) analysis of variance, with repeated measures on
the last factor, sustained this conclusion: a main effect
for Group (F(1,42) = 4.64, P £ .037). No other signifi-
cant results were found.
However, this result does not automatically imply
that children with autism less often acknowledge a
multiple emotional perspective, because it is possible
to ascribe more than two emotional perspectives to the
same multiple emotion scenario. Table 3 displays the
mean frequencies for each condition (maximum = 2)
in which the children of both groups reported such a
multiple perspective (i.e. more than one emotional
reaction). A score in the NN-condition indicates that
children acknowledged at least two negative emotions,
and a score within the PN-condition indicates the
acknowledgement of at least one emotion of both
valences. Seven children with autism never identified
more than one emotion per story. All children from the
control group identified more than one emotion
simultaneously at least twice (out of four stories). A 2
(Group) · 2 (Condition: PN versus NN) analysis of
variance, with repeated measures on the last factor
showed a main effect for Group (F(1,42) = 8.73,
P £ .005), Condition (F(1,42) = 19.91, P £ .001) and an
interaction for Group · Condition (F(1,42) = 4.34,
P £ .043). It can be seen that children in both groups
acknowledged the multiple perspective more often
when it concerned two negative emotions. However,
children with autism fell behind the control group in
this negative–negative condition (T = 3.68, df = 42,
P £ .001), whereas this difference did not reach
significance in the positive–negative condition
(T = .78, df = 42, P £ .440).
Table 4 displays how often each of the basic
emotions appeared in reaction to the four scenarios
Table 3 Mean number of
answers involving more than
one emotion as a function of
Group and Condition
n Positive–Negative Negative–Negative
M SD M SD
Autism group 22 .59 .73 .95 .90
Control group 22 .77 .81 1.77 .53
Table 4 Mean number of
emotion perspectives as a
function of Group and
Emotion
n Happiness Anger Sadness Fear
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Autism group 22 1.36 1.40 1.77 1.15 2.86 .99 1.09 1.15
Control group 22 .95 .90 2.73 .88 3.77 .53 1.00 1.07
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(maximum = 4). Given our previous consideration that
the scenarios did not provide an equal opportunity to
each emotion, a comparison between emotions
becomes somewhat meaningless. However, in the light
of the findings from the first task on single emotions, it
is important to see whether children with autism
referred less to a specific emotion when compared to
the control group. A 2 (Group) · 4 (Emotion: Happi-
ness, Anger, Sadness, Fear) analysis of variance with
repeated measures on Emotion, not only displayed a
main effect for Emotion (F(3,126) = 46.89, P £ .001),
but also showed a main effect for Group
(F(1,42) = 4.64, P £ .037) and an interaction effect
(F(3,126) = 4.99, P £ .003). Post hoc T-tests showed
that children with autism acknowledged the Anger and
Sadness perspective less often than the control group
(T(42) = 3.09, P £ .002, and T(42) = 3.80, P £ .001,
respectively), whereas there were no differences for Fear
and Happiness. Bonferroni correction was applied.
Finally, children were also asked about the intensity
of the emotions they reported. The mean intensity
attributed to Happiness and Fear did not differ
between children with autism and the control group.
However, with respect to the two emotions that chil-
dren with autism identified less often, it appeared that,
when they did identify them, they also attributed a
lower intensity: 2.17 vs. 2.73 (T(38) = 2.02, P £ .025)
for Anger and 3.77 versus 3.00 (T(41) = 3.84, P £ .001)
for Sadness; on a scale from 0 to 5. Bonferroni cor-
rection was applied.
Discussion
A number of our findings fit well with the general
expectation that children with autism are less aware of
their own emotions. When we looked at the data col-
lapsed across emotion, it was found that children with
autism more often claimed not to feel an emotion (note
that this was only for anger when tested separately for
each emotion), were less able to generate emotionally
charged situations from their own experience, provided
fewer emotionally charged social situations (consistent
with the study by Jaedicke et al., 1994), and acknowl-
edged fewer different emotional perspectives in the
multiple emotion scenarios. However, there are also a
number of findings that can be used to shed light on the
specific nature of the awareness problems: Why do
children with autism detect fewer emotional perspec-
tives only in the negatively charged multiple scenarios
and not in the mixed charged ones? Why do they seem
to feel the emotions they reported in the identification
task with the same intensity as the control group? And
finally, what are the reasons for the emotion-specific
differences that we find in both tasks?
The finding that children with autism are equally as
good as the control group at detecting emotions of an
opposite valence within one scenario but not in
detecting emotions of the same valence, suggests that
we cannot attribute their problems to a developmental
delay. As we already mentioned in the introduction, all
studies (Harter & Whitesell, 1989; Meerum Terwogt, &
Olthof, 1989; Wintre & Valance, 1994) unequivocally
indicate that the acknowledgement of simultaneous
emotions of the same valence normally precedes the
acknowledgement of simultaneous occurrence of
opposite emotions. Young children find it difficult to
accept that one and the same situation could elicit
emotions that are the opposite. This is clearly not the
case in children with autism, who accept the possibility
of opposite perspectives and are able to report on
them. Then, why is it that these high functioning chil-
dren with autism make fewer reports of more than one
negative emotion?
Children derive emotion concepts on the basis of the
combined information of three sources: self-monitoring,
the observation of others and the information pro-
vided by the (verbal) community (Harris & Olthof,
1982). The topic in this study concerns the first factor,
but we already know that the second source of infor-
mation is impaired in children with autism: they are
known to neglect emotion signals in others (Begeer
et al., 2006; Jennings, 1974; Weeks & Hobson, 1987).
Additionally, their relative inexpressiveness (Attwood
et al., 1988) makes it plausible that they also receive
less—or at least less systematic—feedback from their
environment, which involves the third factor. This
combination of factors could make it more difficult to
enable these children to link a well-developed concept
of emotions to their own internal signals, even when they
do detect these signals. We therefore suggest that they
might be relatively poor at distinguishing emotions on
the basis of their own experiences, as can also be found
among adults with autism who reported a higher degree
of alexithymia (Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004). Emotions
of the same valence share a larger conceptual overlap,
which makes it more likely that they co-occur more
often in everyday life. However, they are also more
difficult to distinguish from one another than opposite
emotions. If experiencing one or more negative
emotions results in a vague notion, such as ‘‘I feel bad’’,
each of the negative emotion alternatives could cover
this feeling. Nonetheless, it seems as if children with
autism often limit themselves to one of these alterna-
tives, since ‘‘bad’’ is experienced more often as a single
and undivided feeling.
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With respect to children’s intensity judgements, the
data from the first experiment showed that the autism
group did not differ from the normally developing
children. That suggests that their relative inability to
differentiate between emotions does not affect their
awareness of the strength of their reactions. The
awareness problems in the autistic spectrum group
seem to be limited to labelling their emotional reac-
tions. Obviously, a comparison of absolute intensity is
difficult, because one will use his or her own anchor-
points for attributing the intensity-scores. Still, it could
be concluded that children with autism discriminate
between different levels of intensity equally well. They
exhibit the same emotion specific intensity differences
as their normal developing peers, suggesting that they
are aware of some basic conventions concerning emo-
tions among peers (Saarni, 1999). Happiness can be
experienced without restraint. Intense fear (most
respondents are boys) is not a reaction that one easily
wants to admit. Sadness and anger are placed in-
between in the sense that they are only justified on
some occasions.
How do these results fit with the results of the second
experiment? Again, intensity scores of happiness and
fear were the same for both groups. This time, however,
children from the autistic spectrum reported anger and
sadness with less intensity. Moreover, the same two
emotions were selected less often in comparison to the
control group. Contrary to the first experiment, one
could in the second experiment dismiss or disapprove of
a certain perspective by attributing a lower intensity to
an emotion. The low attention given to anger and sad-
ness could be the result of a more dominant position of
fear within the autistic conception of negative feelings
when compared to the control group. We know that
clinicians who work with and observe these children on
a daily basis repeatedly give reports on fear reactions
and it has also been argued that stress and anxiety play
a crucial role in many behavioural problems of children
with autism (Groden, Cautela, Prince, & Berryman,
1994).
Fear is experienced as a threat to one’s security or
safety (Izard, 1991). A reason for a prominent position
of fear can be found in the fact that children from the
autistic spectrum find it difficult to get a grip on the
(especially social) world. Their relatively weak theory
of mind capacities interfere with a full understanding
of other people’s actions and reactions. Consequently,
their perception of control could be low which will
automatically elicit fear. That does not exclude the
experience of anger or sadness in social situations, but
those emotions (especially anger, which implies a cer-
tain feeling of competence to deal with the situation)
could be mostly experienced within very familiar situ-
ations. Indeed, the examples provided by the children
in the first experiment showed that children with aut-
ism less often described social occasions in which anger
was experienced and in which sadness was primarily
experienced in the company of family members
(instead of the peers that were frequently mentioned
by the control group). Yet, these results were derived
post-hoc and future studies will look into this issue
more closely.
This leaves us with one more question: if fear is
indeed a dominant feeling in children with autism why
is that not reflected in the results of the first experi-
ment? The autism group certainly did not provide
more fear examples than the control group and social
examples were completely absent. However, if we look
at the position of fear in comparison with the other
emotions, the control group seem to display a certain
resistance to report fear examples from their own
experiences, whereas the autism group reported as
many examples as they did for happiness. The total
absence of social examples among the children with
autism could originate from another kind of resistance:
fear is one of the emotions they know best, but
producing a fear occasion could revive the emotion to
some extent. Consequently, if you have to produce an
example, you prefer to select one that did not affect
you too much. If this assumption is true, the social
domain is where we could expect fear with the highest
intensity.
In conclusion, the outcomes of this study strongly
suggest that children with autism have difficulties in
identifying their own emotions. We argued that this
might stem from a less developed emotion concept in
these children, which causes an impaired capacity to
differentiate between one’s emotions within the nega-
tive spectrum. The finding that children with autism
reported fewer coping strategies to deal with negative
emotions (Rieffe, Triantafyllakos, & Meerum Terwogt,
2003) also indicates that these children might not have
acquired well-developed knowledge about their own
negative emotions. Instead of using multiple emotion
perspectives, the outcomes of this study seemed to
point more at a simpler, single emotion perspective
within the negative domain, with a more prominent
position of fear in children with autism than in nor-
mally developing children.
One possible objection to the findings in this study
concerns the fact that no explicit verbal and nonverbal
IQ indices were at hand, and only nonverbal measures
for the clinical group were administered. Obviously, a
limited verbal ability could have negatively affected
the outcomes of this study. However, the fact that their
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teachers, who see and work with these children on a
day to day bases, carefully selected the children based
on their verbal and nonverbal functioning in the
classroom, does provide reasonable validity to the
outcomes and prevented the children from extra—and
perhaps unnecessary—testing outside their classroom.
Future studies should confirm these findings and
look more closely into these issues. However, if the
finding that children with autism seem to have less
sophisticated notions about their own emotions and the
nuances involved should be confirmed in future
research, this would improve our understanding of the
problems that these children face. For example, one of
the implications of a less complex emotional experi-
ence is that one’s focus will be limited to one of the
many aspects that can be involved in emotionally laden
situations. Consequently, this limited view will also
prevent one from dealing with the situation in the most
optimal manner. Finally, note that there is no reason to
expect a different outcome for the positive spectrum,
but this was not included in the current study because
only the four basic emotions of happiness, fear, anger
and sadness were incorporated.
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Appendix: Multiple Emotions Vignettes
Happiness/Sadness
Your best friend has been in the hospital for a long
time. But now [s]he is home and you are going to play
with him/her again for the first time since her illness.
‘‘Hi’’ [s]he says very cheerful when [s]he sees you. ‘‘It’s
been a long time!’’ But [s]he still looks very pale. You
can see [s]he is still in a lot of pain.
You are going out on a day-trip with your class. The
teachers made up a very nice programme: first you will
all go out and play in the woods. Then have a picnic.
And in the afternoon you’re going to go to the zoo. But
it turns out that it is very cold that day and it is going to
rain and be windy all day.
Anger/Sadness
You are alone in the house with the babysitter. You
are in the kitchen and then that cat, which followed
you, pushes a beautiful glass bowl from the draining
board. Bang! It is completely shattered. The babysitter
comes in and shouts: ‘‘What have you done!’’ You
shout back: ‘‘I didn’t do anything, it was the cat’’. But
the babysitter doesn’t believe you. As a punishment,
she sends you to your room. It is still very early in the
evening, and all your friends are playing outside. From
your bedroom, you can hear them laugh and having fun
playing a game.
You made a nice ashtray of clay at school. You are
pleased with it and how bright the colours are. You
think: ‘‘I’ll give it to my sister. Sometimes, she smokes,
so she will be happy with it’’. You come home and give
the astray to your sister. But your sister is in a bad
mood and says ‘‘What do you want me to do with that
stupid thing, I already have many ashtrays!’’
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